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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
and 
WENDALL H. HOFFMAN 
Defendant and 
Respondent, ) 
r / 
Appellant. ) 
Case No. 860169 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The appellant's major argument is that the Utah Medical 
Practices Act is overbroad and void for vagueness such that 
the Act has no real meaning. The facts in the case are not 
in conflict. The interpretation of the Act and its application 
is appellant's legal argument. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Medical Practices Act, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended 58-12-30 (4) (a) is overbroad as applied in 
defining the practice of medicine as the testimony does not 
support the conviction of Mr. Hoffman if the practice of 
medicine is defined in Section 58-12-30 (4) (a) (b) and (c). 
Appellant herein attacks the Act as overbroad and void for 
vagueness as applied by the trial court. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
and 
WENDALL H. HOFFMAN, 
Defendant and 
Respondent, ) 
? ) 
Appellant. ) 
Case No. 860169 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The defendant Wendall Hoffman was tried and convicted 
of the unlawful practice of medicine, a violation of the 
Medical Practices Act, Utah Code Annotated as amended, 1953, 
58-12-30, a third degree penalty. Mr. Hoffman was sentenced 
by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde on February 5, 1986. The 
sentence imposed was a 0 - 5 year prison term and a fine of 
$3,100. There was a stay of execution of the prison term 
and the defendant was placed on probation. The appellant 
seeks a reversal and argues that inter alia the Medical 
Practices Act is void for vagueness and overbroad on its 
face and as it applies to appellant. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The jury in the Second District Court returned a guilty 
verdict and the appellant was convicted of a third degree 
felony. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction because 
the Medical Practices Act is overbroad as applied and on 
its face. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State established its case by the testimony of two 
witnesses - Robert Bowen who testified that Mr. Hoffman did 
not now nor did he ever have a license to practice medicine. 
The second witness, Phyllis Frankel, testified that she 
was an investigator for Consumer Protection which is part 
of Business Regulations. There is little dispute in the 
facts of the case. 
Mrs. Frankel, using an assumed name, wrote a letter 
that reached the appellant. In the letter she claimed she 
had stomach pains and that she did not feel well. She asked 
what could be done with her problem. She further stated that 
Mr. Hoffman had helped a friend of hers in the past. 
As a response to her letter, she was told that she had 
10,000 negative energy, that there was some kind of.arsenic 
content in her stomach and that her white blood count was 
down. Prior to sending the letter, Mrs. Frankel called 
Mr. Hoffman's place of business and she was told to send a 
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donation of $60.00. 
On August 1, 1985, Mrs. Frankel went to the office of 
Energy Evaluation and Research at 86 0 West Riverdale in 
Ogden. While she was at the office she spent about 45 minutes 
with Mr. Hoffman. She claimed that she still didnft feel 
well and that she was sick to her stomach. Mr. Hoffman was 
puzzled that she should still have stomach pains because he 
had energy projections to help her condition. 
Mr. Hoffman asked Mrs. Frankel to write her name on a 
piece of paper and he held a swinging pendulum over the 
paper. He indicated that Mrs. Frankel had three ulcers. 
Mr. Hoffman indicated that she should cleanse her food in 
a clorox water solution. He also recommended that 
Mrs. Frankel purchase some pills for $25.00 to help her 
condition. Subsequently Mrs. Frankel did purchase the 
pills. Mrs. Frankel also indicated that if at anytime she 
was not satisfied that the $60.00 would be refunded to her. 
POINT I 
THE STATE OF UTAH LACKED AUTHORITY TO 
PROCEED WITH A FELONY ACTION BECAUSE OF 
ITS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE UTAH MEDICAL 
PRACTICES ACT. 
The appellant was convicted under the Medical Practice 
Act, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 1953, 58-12-26 et. seq. 
The Act is primarily a licensing statute governed by the 
Department of Business Regulations which sets the standards 
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of who shall practice medicine in the State of Utah. The 
relevant parts of the Act consists of three different 
sections. They are cited as follows: 
(1) Utah Code Annotated - 58-12-28(4)(a)(b)(c): 
(4) "Practice of Medicine" means: 
(a) to diagnose, treat, correct, advise, or 
prescribe for any human disease, ailment, injury, 
infirmity, deformity, pain or other condition, 
physical or mental, real or imaginary, or to attempt 
to do so by any means or instrumentality; 
(b) to maintain an office or place of business 
for the purpose of doing any of the acts described in 
Subsection (a) whether or not for compensation; 
(c) to use in the conduct of any occupation 
or profession pertaining to the diagnosis or treatment 
of human diseases or conditions in any printed material; 
stationery, letterhead, envelopes, signs, advertisements, 
the designation "doctor," "doctor of medicine," 
"physician," "surgeon," "physician and surgeon," "Dr.," 
"M.D.," or any combination of these designations, 
unless the designation additionally contains the 
description of the branch of the healing arts for 
which the person has a license. 
(2) Utah Code Annotated 58-12-295: Physicians Licensing 
Board. The representative committee for persons who apply 
for, or have been granted a license to practice medicine and 
surgery in all branches under the Utah Medical Practice Act 
shall be a committee of six physicians licensed under that 
act and one lay member, to be known as the "Physicians 
Licensing Board." Notwithstanding Chapter 1, Title 58, the 
concurrence of at least five members of the board is required 
for the taking of any action under the Utah Medical Practice 
Act. 
(3) Utah Code Annotated, 58-12-30 makes it a third 
degree felony to violate the Act and it also states several 
exceptions to the Act. The only exception relevant herein 
is sub paragraph (5): 
Any individual administering a domestic or 
family remedy including those persons engaged 
in the sale of vitamins, health food or health 
food supplements, herb or other products of 
nature, except drugs or medicines for which an 
authorized prescription is required by law; 
As stated above in Utah Code Annotated Section 58-12-2 9.5 
of the Act it is a condition precedent that the concurrence 
of at least five members of the board is necessary before 
any action can be taken under the Act. 
In the transcript there was never any showing that a 
board was ever convened to discuss appellant's activities. 
If there was such a meeting, there was no testimony showing 
that at least five members of the board agreed that any 
action should be taken against the appellant. 
The respondent has violated the very rules that it is 
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supposed to enforce. Without any authorization from the 
board, the State filed the action against appellant and 
went to trial. The State along with the public should be 
held to the standard of complying with the provisions of the 
Act. 
The provisions of requiring board action before any 
action can be taken are logical. The board may be able to 
solve problems or assist the State in solving problems 
without the necessity of expensive civil and/or criminal 
litigation. 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT DID NOT PRACTICE MEDICINE 
AS DEFINED IN THE ACT 
The definition of the practice of medicine as stated 
in Utah Code Annotated Section 58-12-26(4)(a)(b)(c) is set 
forth as someone who diagnoses and treats, etc.; someone 
who maintains an office to diagnose and treat, etc.; and 
someone who holds himself out to be a doctor. The trial 
court ruled that the subparagraphs are to be treated dis-
junctively such that the practice of medicine is defined 
conclusively pursuant to any of the three subparagraphs 
(Record, page 80). The appellant thinks the trial court 
erred in that the subparagraphs should be read conjunctively. 
If the subparagraphs are to be read conjunctively there 
was an incomplete showing that Mr. Hoffman either had an 
office to diagnose or treat and there was no evidence that 
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Mr. Hoffman held himself out to be a doctor (Record, pages 
26 and 28). Further the jury instructions defined the 
practice of medicine pursuant to Section 58-12-26(4) (a) only. 
If the trial court erred in its interpretation of the 
practice of medicine it would be reversible error because 
of the content of the jury instructions. 
POINT III 
THE ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY BROAD AND 
VOID FOR VAGUENESS 
If the trial court is correct and the practice of 
medicine is defined only in Utah Code Annotated, Section 
58-12-26(4)(a) then the Act is so broad that it renders the 
practice of medicine as meaningless. If one were to attempt 
to draft a definition of the practice of medicine and inten-
tionally attempt to be as overbroad as possible, subparagraph 
(a) could certainly be the result. Not only are real 
illnesses and maladies included in the definition but . . . 
11
 [any] other condition, physical or mental, real or 
imaginery." The treatment or diagnosis of an imaginary 
mental condition would be considered the practice of medicine. 
In other words, every condition of the mind, real or imagined, 
as well as every condition of the body is included in the 
definition. 
Such broadness of the Act renders it meaningless and 
void. Everyone would be practicing medicine on a regular 
basis. One would only need to be prepared to provide 
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advice to help another's physical or mental disposition. 
The person receiving this advice need not even be ill. 
Anyone could be prepared to say: "You should rest/1 or 
"You should take a walk," or "You should go home early." 
These could be construed as forms of advice to help 
another's physical or mental disposition. With such an 
interpretation, the statute may be drawn to a host of other 
ridiculous conclusions. 
The above examples are indirect and subtLe, but are 
still in violation of the Act. The more direct activity 
would clearly be the unlawful practice of medicine: looking 
into the eyes of another? looking into the throat or ears; 
feeling the skin or forehead for fever; asking questions 
about a health condition; procurring or offering aspirin, 
alka seltzer or other over-the-counter remedies. The use 
of vaporizers, atomizers, thermometers and other 
"instrumentalities" are considered the practice of medicine. 
The above activities can only be performed by a person 
licensed in the healing arts (a patent absurdity) or these 
examples are exceptions to the practice of medicine as set 
forth in Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-12-30(5), supra. 
In defendant's motion to dismiss the trial court was given 
an example of this exception (Record, page 87). The Court 
stated that this exception includes the diagnosis and 
treatment cf family members by family members or the treat-
ment of friends by friends even using commercial over-the-
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counter drugs. The language of the exception does not 
support the Court's conclusion. 
There is very little Utah case law that has treated 
the Act, therefore appellant hereinafter cites the actions 
of other courts that have considered the same types of 
statues. 
The State of Texas had a similar statute to that of the 
Act in its definition of the practice of medicine, Article 
4510, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. The three different 
provisions of treating and diagnosing, etc. , having an 
office to treat and diagnose, etc. and holding oneself out 
to be a member of the healing arts are almost identical to 
the Act. In Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038 (1980), 
the plaintiffs challenged the Texas statute that the field 
of acupuncture was restricted to licensed physicians and thus 
not made generally available through other practitioners. 
The Court indicated that the State of Texas had an interest 
to protect its citizens from improper medical services but 
it could not infringe on their constitutional rights. 
The Court, first of all, decided whether a constitutional 
right existed to be protected. It then indicated a long 
line of cases defining the right to privacy such that a, 
"right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain zones 
of privacy does exist," Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
"and it encompasses those interests that can be deemed 
fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 
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One such interest is the "interest in independence in 
making certain kinds of important decisions," Whalen v. Roe, 
429 U.S. 589 (1977). The Court then cites a long line of 
cases that an individual may make personal decisions without 
government interference. The types of decisions are 
marriage, procreation, contraception, child rearing and 
education. 
The Court indicated that the foregoing decisions, "is 
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the 
Bill of Rights but a rational continuum which, broadly 
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantive arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints ... and which also 
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, 
that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny 
of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgements" 
Poe v. Ulman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), 
The Andrews Court at page 1046 cited additional cases 
that set forth a traditional two prong test. "It is the 
individual making the decision and no one else who lives 
with the pain and disease. Second, it is impossible to 
discuss the decision to obtain or reject medical treatment 
without realizing its importance." Two other cases were 
cited highlighting the importance of medical decisions, 
England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 35 9 
U.S. 1012 (1959), "the State cannot deny to any individual 
the right to exercise a reasonable choice in the method of 
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the treatment of his ills. The root premise is the concept, 
fundamental in American jurisprudence, that every human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body." 
The facts in the instant case differ from the facts 
in Andrews such that the activities of Mr. Hoffman were 
certainly less intrusive and much safer than acupuncture. 
Mr. Hoffman did not make any injections; he did not perform 
any surgery; he did not make a physical test or examination; 
and he did not touch the informant's body. It was claimed 
that through sources of energy he evaluated the medical 
condition of the informant. He subsequently suggested that 
she take pills that were natural compounds which were safe 
and not prescription drugs. Mr. Hoffman even offered to 
return any monies the informant spent, if she was not happy 
with the services performed. 
The sources performed by Mr. Hoffman were safe and 
nonintrusive. As indicated in Andrews, acupuncture may be 
unsafe in that the practitioner may place the needles in 
the wrong place and the wrong depth and for the wrong period 
of time. However even with these apparent dangers the Fifth 
Circuit ruled that the Texas statute was unconstitutional. 
The activities of Mr. Hoffman that were of no harm to 
the informant should be allowed. The Act restricts the 
activities of Mr. Hoffman and all the reasonably permissible 
activities stated above. 
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The State has an interest in protecting the public 
against unsafe medical practices performed by inexperienced 
practitioners. However protecting the public by restricting 
permissible safe activities is too much an intrusion of 
governmenta1 interference. 
The acceptable line of cases curtailing a constitutional 
freedom necessitates a "compelling state interest" that 
must be "narrowly drawn to express only" that interest, 
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 686 
(1977). "It is not sufficient for the State to show that 
the Act furthers a substantial state interest. In pursuing 
the important interest, the State cannot choose means that 
unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected 
activity. Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be 
drawn with precision, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), 
"and must be tailored to serve their legitimate objectives" 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 631. "And if there are other 
reasonable ways to achieve these goals with a lesser burden 
on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not 
choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, 
it must choose "less drastic means." Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
With a broad stroke of the legislative brush, the Act 
has prohibited the activities and nonintrusive approach of 
Mr. Hoffman along with the use of vaporizers, aspirin, cold 
and flu remedies and thermometers administered by lay people. 
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The Act's restriction of constitutional activities 
through extreme government interference renders it uncon-
stitutional. The Act must fall because it is overbroad 
on its face and the way it is applied. 
POINT IV 
THE ACT VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION IN 
THAT IT RESTRICTS FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
A person not licensed to practice medicine in the 
State of Utah cannot diagnose or treat any individual unless 
he comes under one of the exceptions of Utah Code Annotated 
58-12-30 (1) through (11). The exceptions deal with those 
who have medical licenses in other states or those who are 
currently seeking certification. Subparagraph 4 treats the 
good Samaritan activities of one who renders aid in an 
emergency. Subparagraph 5 treats the domestic or family 
remedy issue and health foods. Subparagraph 6 addresses 
the healing aspects as part of a religion. 
Other than those matters treated above, there are no 
other exceptions. The Act states that any other procedure 
of diagnosing and treating must be done by a licensed 
practitioner of the healing arts. As has already been 
stated, anyone who does not fit into the above exceptions 
and who is not a licensed medical practitioner cannot 
diagnose one's condition by observing, using a thermometer 
or any other type of device or instrumentality to determine 
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one's medical condition. Also unlicensed medical practitioners 
cannot use vaporizers, atomizers, aspirin or cold and flu 
remedies on any other person. 
The above innocuous activities would be prohibited from 
the general population. The foregoing would suggest that 
the legislature does not feel that any citizen of the State 
of Utah can be trusted to seek medical advice or treatment 
except as outlined in the Act. Unless the Act were strictly 
complied with, even if the services rendered were completely 
safe, fully disclosed and not fraudulent, a felony would 
occur. A Utah citizen does not have the freedom of choice 
to seek alternative medical advice and therapy unless he goes 
to a medical practitioner. The legislature does not trust 
the ability of the citizens of the State of Utah to be able 
to seek out the diagnosis and treatment of their choice. 
Said freedom of choice is similar to the plight of 
patients in a terminal condition who are seeking the right 
to die. If a patient wants to "pull the plug" on his life 
support system he generally must file a lawsuit to achieve 
this right. Courts seem to be siding with the patient's 
request in exercising their will in being able to separate 
themselves from their life support systems. 
In this age of consumerism and high medical costs, 
patients should be able to seek the lowest cost, safe treat-
ment for their medical dollar. Recently the Florida 
legislature passed a statute allowing pharmacists and 
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druggists to advise their customers concerning routine ill-
nesses and injuries. The legislature passed this provision 
to help consumers lower their medical costs by not being 
required to see a medical practitioner for routine and 
mundane treatment. 
The Utah Legislature could not respond similarly to 
help consumers reduce their medical costs without a repeal 
or a major revision of the Act. As stated, the Act requires 
us to see a physician for any medical ailment real or 
imagined no matter how small. Surely a citizen of the State 
of Utah has the sense and wisdom to be able to choose the 
medical treatment he desires, the cost of such medical 
treatment and the procedure so long as the treatment is safe, 
fully disclosed and is not fraudulent, 
CONCLUSION 
The Act should fall because it restricts normal 
acceptable reasonable approaches to diagnosing and treating 
medical conditions and unacceptable practices from which the 
public should be protected such as surgery by an unlicensed 
physician or a guarantee for cancer by paying a fee. The 
Act is so broad that its meaning is not known. The State 
must determine a less restrictive procedure to protect the 
public from unscrupulous practitioners. 
Dated this day of , 1986. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
6/mo 
H. Delbert Welker 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
331 Rio Grande, Suite 102 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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